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On September 7, 1973, a courageous three-judge Japanese district
court held' that the existence of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) violates
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits armed forces and
the maintenance of "war potential."' This decision quashed administra-
tive rescission of a national forest reserve designation, designed to pro-
vide for a Nike missile base' in Naganuma under the 1968 defense
*B.A. 1967, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1974, California Western School of Law;
LL.M. 1975, Columbia University; Member, California Bar; Associate, Booth, Mitchel,
Strange & Smith, Los Angeles, Calif.
1. t6 v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, HANREI J11 (No. 712) 24, in HANREI
TAImUZU (No. 298) 140 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Civ. Dep't, Sept. 7, 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Naganuma Nike case]. A summary translation of the case by Professor Hideo Tanaka
together with an English statement of facts reprinted from 6 LAW IN JAPAN 175 (1974)
appears on p. 46 as an Appendix.
2. Japan's Constitution dictates that:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japa-
nese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat
or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
KENP5 (Constitution) art. IX, paras. 1 & 2 (Japan, 1946) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
cited as Article 9]. The official translation is found in MImSRY OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTTU-
TION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STAT'rUEs (1958).
Fundamental military and political implications of the "war potential" clause are dis-
cussed in McNelly, The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution, 77 POL. ScI.
Q. 350 (1962), and Sissons, The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitution, 37 INT'L.
AiF. 45 (1961).
3. See generally Hawk and Nike Hercules Missile Treaty with Japan, Dec. 22, 1972,
[1973] 1 U.S.T. 434, T.I.A.S. No. 7558; Hawk and Nike Hercules Missile Treaty with
Japan, Oct. 13, 1967, [1967] 1 U.S.T. 2804, T.I.A.S. No. 6365; Air Defense Treaty with
Japan, April 26, 1963, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 490, T.I.A.S. No. 5347.
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buildup plan.4
Governmental' and popular6 sentiments have varied drastically since
the promulgation of Article 9 in 1946. As long as SDF activities can be
characterized as "[w]ar potential, [which] will never be main-
tained,"' Japan's Constitution does not live with the times, thereby
spawning fruitless controversy. The case has been appealed' to an inter-
mediate court,9 but authoritative interpretation by the Japanese Su-
preme Court is necessary since constitutional amendment is currently
unlikely.'0
This article will review the case, its significance within the framework
of Article 9 and potential legislative resolution, and will discuss the
viability of judicial interpretation as an invitation to legislative amend-
ment. Although Japan's Supreme Court may avoid judicial resolution
of this heated political controversy, the highest court must interpret
Article 9, the supreme law of the land, if it is to give life and meaning
to the Japanese Constitution. The Naganuma Nike case presents a justi-
fiable basis for meeting this challenge. The Supreme Court will have to
face it in the near future. The outcome will affect the United States'
defense posture in the Orient, particularly in view of the fall of South
Vietnam, and whether Japan will be able to make military contributions
to United Nations Emergency Forces.
4. See Japan Times, Sept. 8, 1973, at 5, col. 1.
5. See generally id., at 3, col. 3.
6. See, e.g., Hirasawa, Constitution Controversy, Japan Times, May 3, 1974, at 1, col.
4.
7. Article 9, supra note 2. The 1954 SDF law provides that:
The Self-Defense Force shall have as its main duty the self-defense of our country
against direct aggression and indirect aggression in order to guard our country's
peace and independence and to maintain its security, and, to the extent neces-
sary, it shall undertake the maintenance of public order.
Jieitaih6 (Self-Defense Force Law) art. 3(1) (Law No. 165, 1954), in 2 C. STEVENS & K.
TAKAHASHI, MATERIALS ON MODERN JAPANESE LAw 273 (unpublished Colum. U. casebook
1975) (cited with permission) [hereinafter cited as MODERN JAPANESE LAW].
8. The Sapporo District Court is one of forty-nine courts of original jurisdiction. The
District Courts utilize only one judge in the vast majority of cases, but a three-judge court
handles the most important cases and is a prerequisite to appellate review to the Sapporo
High Court, one of eight intermediate courts in Japan. Supreme Court appeals are gener-
ally taken from High Court judgments; however, "jumping appeal" from the District
Court is possible where both parties consent. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF
JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 4 (1970). See also SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, JUSTICE IN JAPAN
22 (1972).
9. Japan Times, Sept. 12, 1973, at 2, col. 1.
10. See section III infra.
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I
CASES AND CONTROVERSY
A. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
Prior to Naganuma Nike, the judiciary struggled with two cases in
which the constitutionality of defense forces was attacked. In the 1959
Sunakawa decision," the Supreme Court ruled that the "war potential"
clause of Article 9 did not apply to troops over which Japan could not
exercise the right of command or supervision, reasoning that "[t]he
pacifism inherent in our Constitution was never intended to mean de-
fenselessness or non-resistance."' 2 Authoritative disposition of the con-
stitutional issue was avoided by invoking the "political question" doc-
trine for the first time in modem Japanese constitutional history,"3 and
the Court refused to discuss the constitutionality of the SDF."
Eight years later, the Eniwa case" was decided, wherein the Sapporo
District Court applied the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine
lege,' and found that the destruction of SDF communication lines by
an anti-SDF group did not come within the terms of the criminal stat-
ute. The "political question" doctrine of Sunakawa was not sufficiently
fungible to be utilized.'"
Following the Eniwa decision, the instant litigation began. Extensive
11. Japan v. Sakata (Sup. Ct., G.B. Dec. 16, 1959), English translation in GENERAL
SECRETARIAT, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, SERIES OF PROMINENT JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT UPON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY No. 4, quashing Judgment of March 30, 1957
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., No. 32 (wa) 1959) [hereinafter cited as Sunakawa case].
12. Id. at 3.
13. The Court indicated that the constitutionality of the Treaty, and its effect in Japan,
is left primarily to the Cabinet and ultimately to the people. See Sunakawa case, supra
note 11, at 6.
14. The "preservation of security and existence" clause of the Constitution's Preamble
was the source for judicially implying the right of self-defense.
15. Judgment of March 3, 1967 (Sapporo Dist. Ct. No. 38 (wa) 1967) in MODERN JAPA-
NESE LAw 258 [hereinafter cited as Eniwa case].
16. The defendant's conduct must conform in all respects to the definitional elements
of the crime charged. Otherwise, there is no crime and punishment cannot be adminis-
tered. This is referred to as Tatbestandsmilssigkeit in German criminal law and Norma-
tividad in Spanish criminal law. But see Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1928).
17. The group had cut communication lines between on-base artillery practice sites.
The applicable criminal statute prohibited destruction of "[w]eapons, ammunition, air-
craft or other defense materiel which is owned or used by the Self-Defense Force." MODERN
JAPANESE LAW 261, art. 121. By deciding that the statute was not violated, the District
Court avoided the issue of whether the Self-Defense Law controverted the constitutional
doctrine of pacifism.
18. For a more extended discussion of the issue avoided by the Eniwa case, see Wada,
A Discussion of the Right of Self-Defense and War Potential, 370 JURISTO (Jurist) 73
(1967), English translation in MODERN JAPANESE LAW 269.
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forest areas around the town of Naganumall had been long protected as
a forest preserve under the Japanese Forest Law,"0 but in 1968 the Chief
of the Sapporo Defense Facilities Office petitioned successfully for a
cancellation of a portion of the Forest Preserve Designation in order to
permit the construction of an Air-Self-Defense Force Nike-Zeus missile
base. Local residents opposed to the base brought an action for suspen-
sion of this order on conservation grounds, 1 but were defeated in the
Sapporo High Court since there was no "urgent necessity" to avoid
"irreparable damage," as provided by statute.' In a companion suit
initiated by 369 Naganuma residents," however, the District Court re-
voked the earlier cancellation of the forest reserve designation,u holding
that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were in violation of Article 9.
B. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The District Court found various procedural arguments unacceptable
grounds for evading the substantive issue centering upon constitution-
ality of the defense installations of the SDF. These included standing,
judicial duty to decide constitutional issues, and the political question
doctrine.
1. Standing to Sue
Standing to sue was confirmed. The forest reserve system, which is
designed to safeguard local inhabitants legally protected by the Forest
Law, was reviewed within the framework of the entire constitutional
fabric. This resulted in a determination that the "right to live in peace"
was threatened by state administrative action." The Supreme Court
19. Naganuma is a town in the Mt. Umaoi National Forest in Hokkaido. For a complete
statement of the facts of the case, see the Appendix to this article.
20. Shinrin h6 (Forest Law) art. 25 (Law No. 249, 1951), in 6 LAW iN JAPAN 175 n.1
(1974).
21. At question was the adequacy of antiflooding measures.
22. Article 25(2) of the Administrative Case Litigation Law of 1962 provides that:
In the event an action for the revocation of a disposition is filed and there is an
urgent necessity to avoid irreparable damage brought about by the disposition
. ..the court may upon application and by decision suspend. . . the effective-
ness of the disposition ....
6 LAW IN JAPAN 175 n.2 (1974) (emphasis added).
23. Eighty-eight residents were persuaded to withdraw from this suit designed to invali-
date operation of the missile base ab initio.
24. This action was authorized by the same section of the Administrative Case Litiga-
tion Law, supra note 22. Following this decision, construction of the base continued. It
was completed in June 1972 and went into operation as of September 1973. Japan Times,
Sept. 8, 1973, at 5, col. 1.
25. The Constitution provides for recognition "[tihat all peoples of the world have the
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could overrule the Sapporo District Court's verification of standing by
deciding that either the "urgent necessity"28 or "public interest",, issues
should have been determined adversely to the plaintiffs. However, the
alleged injury would continue to threaten these or other potential plain-
tiffs. The Supreme Court should concede standing to sue in an Article
9 claim by adopting either of two alternative theories. First, an economic
injury-in-fact was alleged. The cancellation of the Forest Reserve Desig-
nation increased the likelihood of flooding, thus causing real conserva-
tion problems. Second, assuming arguendo that there was no economic
injury-in-fact, summary disposition on the grounds of standing would
discount the unique characteristic of the Constitution's literal wording
regarding pacifism. As indicated by a Japanese commentator:
[M]aintenance of military forces . . . can not guarantee human rights
and the general welfare of people to their full extent. Costly armaments
require the financial sacrifice of the people, and a war can not be waged
without restricting fundamental human rights.n
Since rearmament boldly contradicts the literal language of Article 9,
these plaintiffs have demonstrated their personal stake in this litigation.
Neither the Sapporo High Court nor the Supreme Court can comforta-
bly refute the District Court's favorable determination of standing.
2. Judicial Duty to Decide Constitutional Issues
Article 99 of the Constitution imposes the duty upon all officials to
uphold it.2" The Sunakawa case, affirming the constitutionality of
American forces in Japan, evidences judicial conservatisim likely" to
reappear in Naganuma Nike, although the latter involves indigenous
Japanese forces. The Sunakawa Court determined that "[u]nless the
said treaty is obviously unconstitutional and void, it falls outside the
right to live in peace, free from fear and want." KENP5 (Constitution) Preamble, para. 2
(Japan, 1946).
26. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
27. The Forest Law provides that "[i]n the event that it becomes necessary for reasons
of public interest, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry may cancel the Forest Reserve
Designation. . . ." 6 LAW IN JAPAN 175 (1974).
28. Tabata, Two Treatises on Japanese Constitution, [1956] DOSHISHA L. Rlv. No. 1,
23, 25.
29. The text requires that "[t]he Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State,
members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect
and uphold this Constitution." KENP6 (Constitution) art. 99 (Japan, 1946) (emphasis
added).
30. In reference to the District Court decision in Naganuma Nike, one front-page news
story suggested that "Im]any observers think that the unprecedented decision is destined
to be short-lived in view of the conservative nature of the top court panel." Japan Times,
Sept. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 7.
[Vol. 9:24
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purview of the power of judicial review granted to the court."13 ' In
Naganuma Nike, the Sapporo District Court measured the administra-
tive action by a constitutional standard, although it need not have done
so," and thus the Supreme Court could decide the case without reaching
the constitutional issue. However, the District Court's election to use
the Article 9 yardstick highlighted the artificiality of tolerating what it
considered the unconstitutional exercise of state power. The court stated
that when
[t]he court finds that a judgment of a case will not settle the underlying
dispute without deciding a constitutional issue raised therein the court
has the duty to decide the constitutionality of the act taken by the
state.3
It appears that the ultimate appeal must be determined on constitu-
tional grounds or else the Supreme Court is in effect insulating state
action from judicial review. Like the Sapporo District Court, it must
accept its duty to settle constitutional issues in order to satisfy Article
99's judicial "[o]bligation to respect and uphold [and interpret] this
Constitution."
3. Political Question Doctrine
The grounds for invoking the political question doctrine were consid-
ered by the District Court as being too vague to operate as a procedural
barrier to deciding the substantive constitutional issue.'4 The defen-
dant's position, that acts of government are excluded from judicial re-
view if political in scope, is incompatible with the principle of judicial
supremacy." The premise behind this doctrine is that defense matters
involve political considerations not within the legal domain of the Japa-
nese Supreme Court. 6 A former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Japan" recently commended this theory as a general rule for judicial
review. However, he commented:
31. Sunakawa case at 6 (emphasis added).
32. The litmus for ascertaining the validity of agency action could have been "urgent
necessity" from the Administrative Case Litigation Law, supra note 22, or "public inter-
est" from the Forest Law, supra note 27.
33. Naganuma Nike Case, Appendix at 47.
34. Id.
35. The Constitution provides that "The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with
the power to determine constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act."
KENP6 (Constitution) art. 81 (Japan, 1946). The Constitution is "[t]he supreme law of
the nation and no ... act of government... contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have
legal force or validity." Id., art. 98, para. 1.
36. See Sunakawa case at 6.
37. Kisaburo Yokota, Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo.
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Stated reversely, it follows that, if an act is recognized as obviously
unconstitutional and void at first sight, it comes within the scope of the
power of judicial review of the court and is judged and decided by the
court to be unconstitutional and void.-
The better view, therefore, would be that if an act, alleged to be a
political question, apparently conflicts with the Constitution's "war
potential" clause, there exists an exception to the general rule which
subjects the Government's action to judicial scrutiny.
Review will necessitate consideration of how objective wording and
subjective framer's intent regarding the Preamble and Article 9 are to
influence thc outcome.
II
LEGAL NORM OR POLITICAL GOAL?
A. CREEPING CONSTITUTIONALITY
1. Constitutional Origins
Assuming that the Supreme Court opts to review Naganuma Nike on
its constitutional merits, little legislative history will support alterna-
tive conclusions although some documents will facilitate the inquiry.
The Potsdam Proclamation39 refers to disarmament of Japan but is
too indistinct to assist in the construction of Article 9's intended mean-
ing. Although the potential victors sought complete disarmament and
abolition of industry enabling Japan to rearm, 0 preconstitutional war
threats cannot be properly relied upon as a post-war tool of legal analy-
sis. The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' is like-
wise without probative value; little weight can be attached to a foreign
policy document designed to implement the occupation of Japan. These
documents only guided General MacArthur in issuing various directives
and establishing the broad outline of reformation."
38. Yokota, Judicial Review in Japan: Political and Diplomatic Questions, 13 JAPAN.
ANNUAL INT'L L. 17 (1969).
39. See SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS, 1 POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN app.
A, at 3 (Report of Government Section 1949) [hereinafter cited as Report of Government
Section]. On July 26, 1945, the U.S., the Republic of China, and Great Britain notified
Japan that Japan could end the war prior to their striking the final blows.
40. Id. paras. 9 & 11.
41. Id. app. A, no. 11. Japan was to be demilitarized and "the influence of militarism
will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life." Id. Part I. The
document further provides that "[J]apanese military strength must be destroyed and not
be permitted to revive." Id. Part IV. However, "[t]he Japanese Government will be
permitted . . . to exercise the normal powers of government ... " Id. Part I.
42. Report of Government Section xix.
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A Matsumoto draft constitution 3 alluded to "[a]rmed forces . . .of
a very limited scope such as are necessary for the maintenance of peace
and order in the country."" General MacArthur's rejection of this draft
was designed to reorient Cabinet thinking. Government Section was
ordered to prepare a draft constitution to incorporate the following
major point from MacArthur's own notes:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it
as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its
own security.
No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no
rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force."
Naganuma Nike's challenge is based upon similar language adopted
in Article 9. Article 9 would be even stronger had the Cabinet utilized
MacArthur's exact wording, but the Cabinet did not retain the italicized
portion of his draft. Nevertheless, renunciation of the sovereign use of
force to settle disputes currently prohibits maintaining forces which
would create the safest defense, that of striking the first blow.
Unadulterated compliance with the literal wording of Article 9 was
short-lived. A bitter political controversy arose over inception of the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces in 1950.11 Some have characterized the
SDF as a tool of American imperialism or as part of a reactionary plot
designed to reinstitute clandestine control of Japan; others have viewed
it as a legitimate expression of the sovereign right of self-defense.' Re-
43. State Minister Matsumoto directed the Japanese Cabinet's draft revisions of the
Constitution submitted to SCAP during 1946.
44. See Report of Government Section 101.
45. Id. at 102 (emphasis added). The Japanese Government agreed in principle to draft
wording following closely the terms of the MacArthur draft within ten days of receipt. See
Ward, The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. ScI. Rzv. 980, 1000
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Ward].
MacArthur's 1958 letter to the Chairman of the Constitution Commission stated that
"[niothing in Article 9 prevents any and all necessary steps for the preservation of the
safety of the nation," and noted that he had stated this at the adoption of the Constitution
and also several years later, following the Korean and Chinese threats. Takayanagi, Some
Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution, 43 WASH. L. REV. 961, 978 n.24
(1968).
This view is supported by a recent comment from one of the participants in the promul-
gation of the MacArthur Draft of the Constitution, who said that he revised the Draft to
exclude "Japan shall not maintain armed forces even for her self-support" as an unrealis-
tic clause. Address by Charles Kades, Japan Society of New York City, February 5, 1975.
46. Public opinion is analyzed in D. MENDEL, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND FoREIGN POLICY
(1961); H. FUJIWARA & N. TOMITA, HoSHU DOKUSAi No TEIHEN (The Foundations of Con-
servative Despotism) (1968).
47. See Weinstein, Defense Policy and the Self-Defense Forces, 2 JAPAN INTERPRETER
No. 6, at 165 (1970).
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gardless of the political debate, however, Japan is now primarily respon-
sible for its external defense."
2. United States-Japanese Relations
The United States surely regrets the zeal with which it sought to make
Japan a nonmilitary nation in connection with Article 9.49 The Com-
munists succeeded in the 1949 civil war in China. In 1950, the outbreak
of the Korean War further threatened both the American and Japanese
defense posture in the Orient. By 1951 a peace treaty between Japan and
the Allies avowed that, despite the existence of Article 9:
[J]apan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations and . . . Japan may voluntarily enter into collective
security arrangements. 0
Naganuma Nike can be viewed as challenging this language despite the
ruling in Sunakawa.5' However, the Defense Agency has not clearly
posited that Japan is now substantially responsible for its external de-
fense. Defense of Japan is still officially considered to be a joint respon-
sibility undertaken by treaty with America."
3. United Nations Obligations
These treaties give rise to an additional issue, dormant until the Su-
preme Court authoritatively interprets the constitutional applicability
of Article 9 to the SDF. As a member of the United Nations, Japan
48. The number of SDF Forces in Japan has steadily grown: from 146,285 in 1954 to
231,438 in 1967, for example. Meanwhile, the United States forces stationed there have
been shrinking in size. Id. Table I.
On Jan. 10, 1975, the Cabinet approved Prime Minister Takeo Miki's defense budget
of $4.423 billion for the fiscal year commencing April 1, 1975. The current authorized SDF
strength is 265,963. Both figures are the largest in Japanese history. But cf. Crabbe,
Japanese Show Little Desire to Make Military Comeback, 88 L.A. DAILY TRANSCRIPT No.
14, at 2 (Jan. 20, 1975).
49. See note 45 supra. General MacArthur later repudiated any earlier notions of de-
priving Japan of all self-defense mechanisms. Id. See also N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 1,
1950 at 1, col. 4 and at 17, col. 2.
50. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490
(effective April 28, 1952) art. 5(c) (emphasis added). See also Treaty of Mutual Coopera-
tion and Security with Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 4509
(effective June 23, 1960).
51. See text accompanying note 12 supra, wherein the Court alluded to Japan's inher-
ent right of self-defense as a basis for permitting foreign war potential to be maintained
on Japanese soil.
52. See, e.g., JAMINT6 ANZEN HOSH6 CH6SAKI (Liberal Democratic Party Research Com-
mittee), NIHON No ANZEN To BSEI (Japan's Security and Defense) 266 (1966).
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shares an international obligation to "[g]ive the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter
. ". .., If constitutional interpretation invalidates all war potential,
participation in United Nation interventions may be foreclosed. If noth-
ing else, the wording of Article 9 casts grave doubt upon the dispatch of
the SDF abroad, even for a purpose incidental to international peace-
keeping. United Nations members are not legally bound to provide such
forces absent agreement,54 but security treaties with Japan assert the
U.N. Charter obligation of collective self-defense55 and foreshadow Japa-
nese acquiescence in an arrangement potentially requiring use of her
armed forces in foreign conflicts. The breadth of the Constitution's war
renunciation clause is susceptible to an interpretation that neither wars
of sanction nor wars of self-defense are permissible. 6 Assuming the Su-
preme Court analyzes Naganuma Nike on constitutional grounds, the
issue of United Nations participation would not be embraced in a hold-
ing concerning validity of internal administrative action. If the SDF is
unconstitutional, the Government impliedly would continue to violate
the war potential clause by maintaining forces under the guise of con-
tributing to United Nations Emergency Forces.
Resolution of these issues is contingent upon whether Article 9 is a
legally established norm or merely a political goal. The Court cannot
bootstrap the more liberal interpretation of Article 9 by relying on
foreign-related documents, treaty terms, or United Nations Charter pro-
visions as a basis for constitutionality. The proper construction of Arti-
cle 9 in Naganuma Nike must be based on indigenous constitutional
sources for measuring administrative or other governmental acts.
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5 (emphasis added).
54. The Charter provides that:
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance and facilities. . . necessary for the purpose of maintain-
ing international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1 (emphasis added). Members must agree to accept and carry
out all Security Council decisions. Id. art. 25. If a member, not represented on the Council,
is called upon to provide armed forces under art. 43, that member may participate in
decisions incident to the satisfaction of its obligation. Id. art. 44.
55. See, e.g., note 50 supra and accompanying text.
56. Japanese scholars are split over the type of "war" renounced by Article 9. One
school insists that wars of self-defense are not within its scope. NATIONAL STUDIES ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS 214 (1958). The majority
view interprets Article 9 as prohibiting all wars. Kozai, Japanese Participation in United
Nations Forces: Possibilities and Limitations, 9 JAPAN. ANNUAL INT'L L. 10, 11 n.3 (1965).
Under this view, Japan cannot use force in any international dispute since it does not
recognize the right of belligerency of the State.
1975]
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B. THE PREAMBLE
One intrinsic basis for measuring the legality of the SDF is the prelim-
inary language introducing the Constitution. Its analytical utility in
resolving the Article 9 controversy focuses upon whether it created posi-
tive norms, or is merely declarative of political aspirations. Both for-
eign"7 and Japanese58 scholars have referred to the Preamble as only
political rhetoric serving no useful purpose. In spite of these opinions,
the Naganuma Nike court espoused the judicial viewpoint that "[t]he
meaning of the Preamble (and Article 9) should be found objectively in
the same manner as any other legal norm."59
Six clauses in the Preamble are relevant in characterizing it as either
political or normative. The first clause, the proviso that "[n]ever again
shall we be visited with the horrors of war,"6 could hardly be construed
as positive law since it is not an identifiable statement of state responsi-
bility. Other international documents espouse the natural law philoso-
phy that war is no longer an acceptable means of international diplo-
macy;6' such wording is too readily identified with diplomatic rhetoric
abandoned in the course of time and under the shadow of alien forces.
The second clause, the preambular expression "peace for all time,""2
similarly lacks the force of positive law. The concept of disarmament,
as a positive duty of the state, has persisted since the Old Testament.
This tradition arguably represents an aspect of the Japanese way of life,
57. SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS
BY FOREIGN SCHOLARS ON PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, 1946 at 79
(1964). The language of the Preamble has been characterized as "[r]hetoric and evangeli-
cal, strongly flavored by the natural law concepts of the 18th century [evidencing] the
American aspiration of the entire document." Id. 154. The conceptual background of the
revision debate can be found in Takayanagi, Some Reminiscenses of Japan's Commission
on the Constitution, supra note 45, and Takayanagi, The Conceptual Background of the
Constitutional Revision Debate in the Constitution Investigation Commission, 1 LAW IN
JAPAN 1 (1967).
58. See, e.g., Yokota, Renunciation of War in the New Japanese Constitution, 4 JAPAN.
ANNUAL INT'L L. 16, 18 (1960); Wads, A Discussion of the Right of Self-Defense and War
Potential, supra note 18, at 114.
59. Naganuma Nike case, Appendix at 48.
60. KENPO (Constitution) Preamble, para. 1 (Japan, 1946). This phrase was considered
by the Court in Sunakawa, and the Court determined that in providing Japanese facilities
for foreign armed forces, it could not be said that "there is no danger of the horrors of
war being visited upon our country. . . contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. .. .
Sunakawa case, MODERN JAPANESE LAW 199. In finding the treaty constitutional, however,
the Court did not rely on this clause.
61. See, e.g., the United Nations Charter providing that: "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS [ARE] DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war
.. " U.N. CHARTER Preamble.
62. KENP6 (Constitution) Preamble, para. 2 (Japan, 1946).
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but it expresses a broad hope, and is not a legal yardstick for measuring
constitutionality of government action. Japan's so-called "Peace Con-
stitution" expresses a desire for peace not necessarily coextensive with
a denial of the right of self-defense. All too often, the unavoidable path
to peace is frequently marked by maintenance of war potential as a
deterrent.
A more substantial inquiry, regarding the characterization of the
Preamble as political aspiration or legal norm, results from examination
of the third clause; that "[w]e have determined to preserve our security
and existence. . .,"" and the fourth clause, which says that Japan must
"[o]ccupy an honored place in an international society striving for the
preservation of peace ... .""' Other nations adopt preservation of their
own national interests as the underlying rationale for maintaining war
potential for self-defense. Therefore Japanese progressives view the con-
stitutional doctrine of unarmed neutrality as inimical to Japan's own
rational interests." Japan cannot be conquered by those who would take
advantage of her pacifist model for international relations. The rejection
of naked neutralism in Sunakawall attests to Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of the "preservation of security" and "honored place" clauses as a
logical basis for maintaining defense potential rather than war poten-
tial. Since Naganuma Nike focuses upon indigenous rather than foreign
forces, former judicial construction of the Preamble could be only mar-
ginally relevant. It is this author's opinion that the preservation of secu-
rity clause is a pervasive norm defining state responsibility to its citi-
zens. When the Preamble is juxtaposed with Article 9 of the Constitu-
tion, a practical conflict is evident. The uniqueness of Japan's pacifist
Constitution is rooted in its literal renunciation of war potential. Since
other nation states have not adopted corresponding constitutional lan-
guage, Japan's war potential renunciaticn is by definition in a vacuum.
This has given rise to creation of the SDF and Naganuma Nike litiga-
tion. Since the Government recognizes a duty to sustain defense poten-
tial, "preservation of security" has been redefined.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. For a discussion of this theory beyond the scope of this article, see Ueyama, Wanted:
An Autonomous Approach to Defense, 4 J. Soc. & POL. IDEAS IN JAPAN 43 (1966). A
representative Japanese constitutional scholar advocates that "[t]he preamble . . . has
never meant that we cannot help it even if our nation is conquered by a foreign power."
Yokota, Renunciation of War in the New Japanese Constitution, supra note 58, at 18.
66. The Court stated:
In view of this [occupation of an honored place] it is only natural for our country,
in the exercise of powers inherent in a state, to maintain peace and security, to
take whatever measures may be necessary for self-defense ....
Sunakawa case at 3.
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The fourth clause, asserting a "right to live in peace,""7 further sup-
ports the normative value of the Preamble, albeit adversely to the inter-
ests of the plaintiffs in Naganuma Nike. If the Government presses the
typically political connotation of preambular wording, it will advocate
that this right is an empty promise if Japan is without forces to maintain
peace. This reading is supported by an opinion of two Justices in the
Sunakawa case, 8 although the Naganuma Nike court used it differ-
ently." Nonetheless, judicial utilization of this clause is evidence of its
legally binding effect, notwithstanding mixed interpretations. When
compared with the war renunciation proviso of Article 9, the Naganuma
Nike construction of the right to live in peace is more rational. Renun-
ciation of war potential, arguably including the stationing of Nike-
Hercules missiles," conflicts with the Sunakawa interpretation of the
right to live in peace as guaranteed by the Constitution's Preamble.
The sixth and final clause relevant to interpreting the alternative
political or legal status of the Preamble is that "[n]o nation is responsi-
ble to itself alone ... ."I' The duty of Japan to sustain its sovereignty
in relation to other nations includes maintaining regional defense pos-
ture and cooperative United Nations maintenance of international
peace and security. If the Constitution is not altered to clearly conform
to this duty, State responsibility is merely political in nature and con-
vertible by changing circumstances and variable interpretations.
As indicated by the Sunakawa District Court, which held American
troop presence to be an unconstitutional 2 violation of Article 9, the
Preamble "[riepresents a lofty ideal and an heroic resolve that we will
be the vanguard in realizing ever-lasting world peace based on justice
and order." 3 The principle of pacifism has been legalized in its strictest
sense in the Japanese Constitution. This does not prohibit repulsion of
aggressive forces, but does prohibit laws and administrative acts in
conflict with pacifism. Considering the Constitution as a whole, it is
67. KENPO (Constitution) Preamble, para. 2 (Japan, 1946).
68. Our Constitution recognizes the "right of survival" of our country as it is
clear from the proclamation that ". . . we recognize . . . the right to live in
peace" as contained in the Preamble.
Sunakawa case at 59 (supplemental opinion by Okuno and Takahashi, JJ.).
69. The court in Naganuma Nike reasoned that the Forest Act protects "the local
inhabitants' right to live in peace . .. ." and determined, therefore, that "such inhabit-
ants shall have standing in court to attack the validity of such disposition." Id., Appendix
at 47.
70. See generally Hawk and Nike Hercules Missile Treaty with Japan, Dec. 22, 1972,
[1973] 1 U.S.T. 434, T.I.A.S. No. 7558.
71. KENP6 (Constitution) Preamble, para. 3 (Japan, 1946).
72. Sunakawa Dist. Ct. case, MODERN JAPANESE LAW 201. The District Court was re-
versed on appeal to the Supreme Court.
73. Id. at 197.
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apparent that at least the preambular governmental duties to "preserve
security and existence" and ensure the "right to live in peace" are
legally binding requirements that must be injected into appellate con-
sideration of Naganuma Nike. Characterizing these clauses as binding
norms is a condition precedent to analyzing the meaning of constitu-
tional war renunciation.
C. ARTICLE 9
1. The Civil Law and Statutory Construction
A common lawyer's attempt to guide the Supreme Court in
Naganuma Nike is fraught with the danger of superimposing common
law statutory construction 4 upon the civil law of Japan. Civil law courts
do not judicially legislate as freely as do their common law counterparts;
intent is secondary to manifest meaning. 5 In Japan, the imported West-
ern apparatus 7 for administering the laws has not been utilized exten-
sively as in the West." Although the codes, statutes, and Constitution
itself are of Western origin, judicial interpretation is not expected to
operate as in the United States. Drawing from the common law method,
the Supreme Court would attempt to fathom the intent of the framers78
while construing the Constitution within a contemporary framework. 79
The first version of Article 9 emanated from General MacArthur's
74. Statutory interpretation in the United States, in the words of one scholar,
"[plermits the court to be inconsistent. The freedom is concealed either as a search for
the intention of the framers or as a proper understanding of a living instrument, and
sometimes as both." E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REAsONING 7-8 (1963).
75. This difference is typically rooted in the supremacy of the legislature to create
sufficiently detailed laws so that mistrusted judges do not arbitrarily misapply the law.
See generally, F. LAwSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW (1953).
76. See generally authorities cited in note 8 supra.
77. The Japanese people prefer the mediation method to the black-and-white judi-
cial method in the resolution of disputes. Some account for this attitude by the
deep influence of the Confucian teaching that "harmony is to be valued," that is
to say, by the general feeling that the judicial method is not conducive to abiding
harmony between the parties concerned.
Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961 in
LAW IN JAPAN at 39 (von Mehren ed. 1963).
78. Participants included the U.S. Department of State (State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee & Office of the Political Advisor), Supreme Commander Allied Powers
(Government Section), Far Eastern Advisory Commission (Headquarters in Wash., D.C.),
Japanese Diet's Matsumoto Committee for the Investigation of Constitutional Problems.
Regarding the interplay of these participants, see Ward, supra note 45. See generally
Report of Government Section.
79. This approach is particularly urged since, as one observor has put it, "of all the
possible candidates, only the Japanese Government displayed any reluctance to father
this document." Ward 987-88.
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pen,8" due to impatience with the meticulous drafting process of the
Mastumoto Cabinet Committee for the Investigation of Constitutional
Problems.8' His draft did not permit war potential even for preservation
of security. The Occupation's zeal to ensure permanent elimination of
Japanese war potential, however, does not dictate contemporary adher-
ence to that policy. After the outbreak of the Korean War, MacArthur
issued a subsequent directive to Prime Minister Yoshida to establish a
National Police Reserve. 2 It is possible that MacArthur drew upon the
authority of the very first official SCAP directive3 as a legalistic cello-
phane masking fear of a Korean or Chinese takeover of Japan.
2. Analysis of Article 9
Several portions of Article 9 must be analyzed by the Naganuma Nike
Supreme Court in order for the Court to mitigate popular accusations
of arbitrary statutory construction in its attempt to interpret the Consti-
tution as a "living" document.
The initial phrase, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, . ... "' bears upon whether subsequent clauses are
normative or merely expressions of a pacifistic political posture. The
Japanese Commission on the Constitution has pointed out that during
the drafting of the 1946 Constitution General MacArthur stated that
"Article 9 is in the nature of a political manifesto, however important,"
and that it would not prevent Japan from defending herself from aggres-
sion." This observation is clearly contrary to MacArthur's personal draft
of Article 9 renouncing war potential even to preserve internal security.
His subsequent opinion would be analogous to a reverse ex post facto,
supporting SDF constitutionality while the 1946 text prohibits mainte-
nance of air, sea, and land forces. Various Japanese" and American"
80. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
81. SCAP lamented that "[ihe Government . . indicated little desire to undertake
the work, and attempted to resolve the issue with a show of words and a bow in the
direction of the West." Report of Government Section at 101.
82. The difficulties of implementing this directive, in view of the attitude of the popu-
lace toward war, is discussed in S. YOSHIDA, THE YOSHIDA MEMOIRS 182-95 (1962).
83. SCAP's first General Order provided that "[t]he Japanese Police Force . . . will
be exempt from this disarmament provision." SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS,
SCAP DIRECTIVE TO THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT No. 1 (Military and Naval) at 2
(1945).
84. Article 9, para. 1 (emphasis added).
85. COMMISSION ON THE CONSTrrTUTON 217.
86. Commission Chairman Takayanagi agreed with MacArthur's interpretation that
Article 9 is essentially a political manifesto. See COMMISSION ON THE CONSTrruTION 218.
Scholarly opinions advocating constitutionality of the SDF law are summarized in Wade,
A Discussion of the Right of Self-Defense and War Potential, supra note 18, at 90.
87. Prof. John Maki of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the Univ. of Washing-
ton spoke of the Article 9 controversy as an issue that is political, not constitutional, in
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scholars do not consider Article 9 to be legally binding. Notwithstanding
the apparent normative nature of subsequent clauses, interpretations
based upon intent of the framers is conflicting. The "political mani-
festo" characterization of the internal text is far less acceptable than
when advocating the similar political effect of the Preamble.
The legally binding nature of Article 9 is more evident in the phrase
whereby the Japanese "[florever renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation." ' The plain meaning of the phrase indicates that all war,
not only aggressive war, was thereby renounced. Arguably, if a sovereign
possesses the inherent right of self-defense," it may renounce that right.
The clause implies that Article 9 provided for unilateral disarmament
since Japan is expressly precluded from maintaining war potential.
The difficulty of statutory construction is discernible from reviewing
the phrase which modifies the war renunciation clause. Threat or use
of force "[a]s a means of settling international disputes" is clearly
illegal. Whether this clause applies to internal defense is unclear. The
constitutional vantage point from the pending Naganuma Nike litiga-
tion gives rise to a different connotation than existed during the occupa-
tion. Article 9 resolved an international problem, not necessarily a do-
mestic one. Allied zeal for suppressing Japan's future war potential was
evidenced by the mostly give-but-little-take of the entire constitutional
drafting process."0 A modern view of the international dispute clause
indicates that the Article 9 prohibition of war potential does not extend
to indigenous self-defense measures.' In an age of atomic interconti-
nental ballistic missiles, Japan's SDF would not amount to a tenable
offensive war force.92 Due to the alternative theoretical constructions of
the international disputes clause it could be understood as normative
in nature, but such an understanding would be a makeweight argument
nature. He notes that "[i]f there is a change for the better in the international situation,
then it will be possible for the SDF to be dissolved and Article IX will then become
effective." COMMISSION ON THE CONsTITUTION 60 (emphasis added). See generally, Maki,
Japan's Rearmament: Progress and Problems, 8 WEST. POL. Q. 545 (1955); Maki, The
Japanese Constitutional Style, 43 WASH. L. REv. 893 (1968).
88. Article 9, para. 1.
89. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. When the SDF bill was pending before the Japanese Diet,
Minister Kanamori recognized the right of self-defense although it was not stated in the
Constitution. COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 217.
90. Address by Dale Hellegers, Japan Society of New York City, Feb. 5, 1975. The
results of Ms. Helleger's exhaustive study of the process will be published by the Parker
School of Foreign and Comparative Law of Columbia University in early 1976.
91. In this connection, see the self-defense provision of the United Nations, U.N.
CHARTER art. 51.
92. On the other hand, if warfare is limited to tactical rather than strategic combative
forces due to fear of atomic weapons, the SDF would continue to represent a militarily
feasible means of waging external combat.
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for whichever constitutional position the Supreme Court ultimately
adopts.
The phrase "[iln order to accomplish the aim of the preceding para-
graph. . ." at the beginning of paragraph two of Article 911 was added
by amendment of Chairman Ashida of the House of Representatives'
drafting committee with the apparent intent of making way for the
interpretation that Article 9 was not applicable to self-defense mecha-
nisms." This could ingeniously be used as a device for legalizing the
SDF. The intent underlying the Ashida amendment conflicts with the
explicit language following it, which prohibits land, sea or air forces.
Proponents of the Ashida amendment rationale would attempt to dem-
onstrate that the ground-to-air missiles of Naganuma Nike cannot be
used as offensive weapons. The aim of paragraph one of Article 9 is
merely to prevent accumulation of offensive war power. Therefore, de-
ployment against foreign aircraft or offensive missiles is inherently a
defensive military function. This line of reasoning was developed to
controvert the plain meaning of paragraph two's conspicious renuncia-
tion of land, sea and air forces which constitute war potential without
any stated exception.
When the Defense Forces Bill was presented to the Diet in 1950, the
Government adopted the Kanamori theory of unilateral disarmament."
The SDF was not considered to be war potential in conflict with Article
9,6 and the judicial dictum in Sunakawa reiterated that the prohibition
on war potential was not intended to mean naked neutralism." Never-
theless, Article 9 is not to be retracted as easily. Its elasticity is limited
by examining the Constitution as a whole. Of eleven chapters, it is one
of only two chapters which contain only one article. 8 This attests to its
preferred position among other constitutional articles as well as a limita-
tion on broadened interpretation surely disavowed by the drafters. In
support of this view, the Naganuma Nike District Court determined
that the interpretation of legal norms such as Article 9 should not be
93. For the complete text of Article 9, see note 2 supra.
94. COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 217-18. This intent is in square conflict with the
feelings of Former Prime Minister Yoshida that "[r]earmament, for Japan, is simply a
word with which politicians and others may conjure, but which to anyone with the slight-
est knowledge of the subject can never be anything more than a word." YOSHIDA, supra
note 82 at 191-92.
95. See note 89 supra.
96. COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 218.
97. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
98. Article 96, regarding amendments, is the only other article occupying a complete
chapter with its text. This reinforces a construction that both renunciation of war and




inherently altered by changed political circumstances.9
The final clause of Article 9 prohibits the "[r]ight of belligerency of
the state ... ."I" Belligerency implies taking part in war or participat-
ing in actions likely to provoke fighting.'0 ' Based upon the belligerency
clause, a makeweight argument could be asserted in favor of SDF consti-
tutionality. The SDF currently exists for nonaggressive purposes, and
is therefore nonbelligerent. The mounting equipment, strength, and
budget of the SDF, however, is proportional to its mounting capability
for belligerency. The balance of power has historically affected the deci-
sion of potential belligerents to wage acts of belligerency. The contem-
porary operational size of the SDF is not conducive to continued
strained interpretations of Article 9, attempting to legalize what the
literal language of the Constitution prohibits.
III
LEGISLATIVE REFORM-INITIATIVE OR INERTIA?
Since constitutional interpretation is an unsatisfactory method of re-
solving the Article 9 controversy, it would be preferable if the constitu-
tional issue in Naganuma Nike can be resolved by the legislative process
rather than by judicial decision. As a practical matter, therefore, consid-
erations of public sentiment become paramount."2 Sometime prior to
the decision, the internationally famous novelist Yukio Mishima had
committed harakiri at Eastern Army headquarters in Tokyo, appealing
for constitutional revision.0 3 Twenty-five minutes prior to the
Naganuma Nike decision, the Defense Agency's Director Yamanaka
told a press conference that he was prepared to walk a "road of hell"
since the SDF authorities expected the Sapporo District Court to rule
adversely to the SDF.""1 The day of the decision, Mayor Motoyama of
Nagoya announced that he would not allow a park in the city to be used
99. Naganuma Nike case, Appendix at 48.
100. Article 9, supra note 2, para. 2.
101. It is theorized that international law should recognize an intermediate phase be-
tween war and peace and that the existence of "war" should be defined differently for
different purposes. See Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate
State Between Peace and War?, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954); McDougal, Peace and War:
Factual Continuum with Multiple Legal Consequences, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1955).
102. A Japanese opinion poll published in 1969 indicated popular sentiment for and
against the SDF. 17 percent of the 3000 voters interviewed thought that the SDF was
unconstitutional, while 40 percent thought it was constitutional. A majority of 64 percent
thought that the constitution need not be revised, while 19 percent favored revision.
Asahia Shimbum, Opinion Poll on the Problems of Defense and the Security Treaty 8,
English translation in MODERN JAPANESE LAW 319.
103. Japan Times, Sept. 8, 1973, at 3, col. 6.
104. Id.
19751
Cornell International Law Journal
for the October 28th anniversary of the SDF.0 5 After the decision, the
General Council of Trade Unions of Japan launched a nationwide anti-
SDF campaign on the basis of Naganuma Nike."'8
These reactions encompassing the District Court decision are indica-
tive of a rift between political fact and the constitutional fiction of
Article 9. SCAP did not "order" the Japanese Government to adopt its
1946 draft constitution. Due to impatience with the Matsumoto Com-
mittee, Cabinet representatives were given two days to "accept" Gov-
ernment Section's draft as a basis for revision acceptable to the Occupa-
tion. "' Ten days later, Japan adopted a draft constitution substantially
similar to the MacArthur draft." 8 The Emperor officially sanctioned a
draft, produced the following month, as representing the will of the
people. 0 '
Since withdrawal of the Occupation in 1952, constitutional revision
has been continuously debated. Japan's mutual interests with the
United States regarding Japan's defense posture has by fait accompli
given rise to creeping constitutionality for her maintenance of land, sea,
and air forces which includes the missile base controversy in Naganuma
Nike.
As reported by the Commission on the Constitution,' those favoring
amendment are of two varieties. First, there are those who support the
unilateral disarmament interpretation of Article 9,"' seeking amend-
ment in order to legitimize the SDF. This view finds support in the
Sunakawa case which carved the implied right to self-defense from the
Preamble."'
A second basis for revision is rooted in disgust with academic interpre-
tations, with a view toward revising the scope of Article 9 with crystal
clarity. As stated by the Managing Director of the Federation of Em-
ployer's Associations, "[a]s long as Article 9 of the Constitution re-
mains the SDF will continue to be a headache.""' The position of the
105. Id.
106. Japan Times, Sept. 12, 1973, at 2, col. 1. The 1,000,000-member All Japan Prefec-
tural and Municipal Workers' Union similarly lauded the court's decision by refusing to
cooperate with the SDF in recruitment of men and women. Id., Sept. 8, 1973, at 3, col. 6.
The Sapporo SDF decided to hold its annual anniversary review on base rather than in
the city. The change was allegedly not the result of the Naganuma Nike decision. Id., Oct.
16, 1973, at 3, col. 6.
107. Ward at 1000 n.157.
108. Id. at 1000.
109. Id. at 1002, drawn from SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS, SUMMATION OF
NON-MLrrARY AcrwrnEs 18 (1946).
110. See generally COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 85, at 219.
111. See note 89 supra and text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
112. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
113. Japan Times, Sept. 8, 1973, at 3, col. 1. Mr. Sakurada noted that "[t]he SDF is
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Liberal-Democratic Party adheres to this second rationale for revision.
From its strong and controlling Diet position, the Party has urged that
revision is necessary to clearly delineate the role of the SDF.111 The Party
rebuked the Naganuma Nike decision as being unacceptable since
"[elvery Japanese understands that Japan has a right to self-reliant
defense.""' Other political parties, however, oppose amendment and
support the Naganuma Nike ruling. These parties are backed by busi-
ness"' and labor."'
The Commission on the Constitution reported that those opposed to
amendment are also of two groups."8 One viewpoint is that there is no
practical need to revise Article 9 since establishment of the SDF was
impliedly constitutional."' The moderates in this group reason that the
Constitution does not negate the right of self-defense and that "[i]t is
natural that Japan should maintain a minimum level of self-defense
power in order to maintain her territorial integrity."' 120
The three major opposition parties do not favor amendment. They
support the unilateral disarmament interpretation of Article 9 and agree
with the Naganuma Nike ruling."' All three parties unsuccessfully'22
urged the Government not to appeal. The Japan Socialist Party and
Japan Communist Party ventured a step further than the Komeito
Party in demanding immediate dissolution of the SDF. '
This parliamentary clash precludes the likelihood of legislative resolu-
tion of the issue prior to a Supreme Court decision in Naganuma Nike.
Pacifists view the SDF as inherently unconstitutional. The moderates
support the SDF's inherent constitutionality. These strange bedfellows
oppose revisionist hopes of amending Article 9 to either prospectively
a [sic] dubious existence from the legal point of view. This could lead to the wasting of
human resources." Id., at 3, col. 2. He stated that it was open to question as to whether
the judiciary alone should handle the SDF constitutionality question in Naganuma
Nike since "the Government should try to obtain a national consensus on this matter."
Id.
114. Id. at 3, col. 1.
115. Id. at 3, col. 2.
116. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
117. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
118. See generally COMMISSION ON THE CONsTrrITUON 219.
119. This approach is probably rooted in the Ashida amendment theory that Article 9
was drawn to exclude self-defense forces from its meaning. See text accompanying note
94 supra.
120. Japan Times, Sept. 8, 1973, at 3, col. 1. The moderate Democratic Socialist Party
avoided direct comment on the Naganuma Nike ruling, but hinted that "[t]horough
discussion should be conducted on the legitimacy and limits of Self-defense Forces." Id.
121. Id.
122. See Japan Times, May 3, 1974, at 12, col. 1.
123. Id., Sept. 8, 1973, at 3, col. 1.
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create or retrospectively ratify SDF constitutionality. This political
stalemate has vitiated legislative momentum towards amendment of
Article 9, making it impossible for the Japanese people to vote upon the
SDF's constitutionality. The condition precedent to popular referendum
is a concurring vote of two-thirds of the members of each House of
Japan's bicameral legislature.'24 Constitutional amendment is therefore
unlikely.
Progressive politicians and a majority of constitutional scholars want
Japan to remain unarmed and neutral, thereby avoiding participation
in the cold war. Conservatives adhere to individual and collective de-
fense measures and scoff at what they term naked neutralism. As one
Japanese commentator laments:
It is noteworthy that these two schools, both of which completely rule
out an independent defense system for Japan, grew out of American
foreign policies which, at two different periods, the United States formu-
lated on the basis of her own national interest.'
Nevertheless, the tide of public opinion appears to be increasingly op-
posed to revision of Article 9.11 On the other hand, recruitment by the
SDF has steadily increased throughout the same period.'2 Proponents
of the SDF view Article 9 as incidental to a foreign constitution imposed
by clandestine American influence, designed to restrain the otherwise
universally recognized inherent right of self-defense.
CONCLUSION
National debate has pervaded armed forces activities since the incep-
tion of the Self Defense Forces over twenty-five years ago. This has given
rise to the notion that the renunciation of war in Article 9 is the dead
letter of an outmoded Constitution imposed during foreign Occupation.
Article 9 contains no reservation in its renunciation of war potential,
however, and the phrase "war potential" should include the missile base
at Naganuma. The fault regarding this long-smoldering controversy lies
both with the legislative and the judiciary: the former has been unwill-
ing to put the war renunciation article to the democratic test of popular
referendum and the latter has acquiesced in the creeping constitution-
124. KENP6 (Constitution) art. 96, para. 1 (Japan, 1946).
125. Ueyama, Wanted: An Autonomous Approach to Defense, supra note 65, at 43.
126. The Asahi Shimbum polls, e.g., note 102 supra, show that in 1952 32 percent
opposed revision; over a span of eleven years, this figure climbed to 61 percent. See also
Ueyama, Wanted: An Autonomous Approach to Defense, supra note 65, at 45. Ueyama is
of the opinion that distrust of military power which accrued during the Meiji period
coupled with contemporary abhorrence of nuclear weapons are the prime factors causing
increased opposition to revision.
127. See note 48 supra.
[Vol. 9:24
Naganuma Nike Case
ality of the Japanese forces by its stagnant view that the SDF is an
irreversible fait accompli.
If the Naganuma Nike Supreme Court holds the missile base to be
"war potential," in accordance with the plain meaning of the Constitu-
tion, the legislature will be abruptly disgorged from the ivory tower
dispute which has worked to deny the people an opportunity to amend
Article 9. The SDF should be authoritatively ruled unconstitutional.
The voter would then be afforded the occasion to authorize the SDF by
constitutional amendment, thereby validating both treaty obligations
with the United States and international peacekeeping contributions.'28
Autonomous self-defense will be more palatable to the most extreme
pacifist than would another generation of creeping SDF constitution-
ality. Government branches which fear placing the national destiny in
the hands of the voter are as defunct as the Constitution they purport
to uphold.
128. Japanese constitutional scholars are split regarding the conflicting Constitutional
Supremacy theory and the Treaty Supremacy theory. Sato, Treaties and the Constitution,
43 WASH. L. REv. 1057, 1063-66 (1968). If the latter theory prevails, a finding of SDF
unconstitutionality would not relieve Japan of treaty obligations in the nondomestic
sphere. Even if the former theory prevailed, customary international legal principles dic-
tate that domestic law is no defense to breach of a public international covenant. See,
e.g., notes 3 & 54 supra.
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APPENDIX
t6 v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry*
HENREI JIH6 (No. 712), in HANREI TAIMuzU (No. 298) 140
Sapporo District Court, Sept. 7, 1973
In order to permit the construction of an Air Self-Defense Force Nike-
Zeus missile base and connecting roads, the Chief of the Sapporo De-
fense Facilities Office on June 12, 1968, presented to the Governor of
Hokkaid6 a petition addressed to the Minister of Agriculture and For-
estry requesting the cancellation of the Forest Preserve Designation
(Hoanrin shitei) of a section located in the Township of Naganuma of
the Mt. Umaoi National Forest inHokkaid6.Since 1897 extensive areas
of the forest had been protected as a forest preserve under article 25(1)
of the Forest Law or equivalent statutes for the purpose of water re-
source conservation. After two public hearings-the second gavelled to
a close in the midst of disruption and turmoil-the Minister of Agricul-
ture and Forestry on July 7, 1969, announced cancellation of the desig-
nation pursuant to article 26(2) of the Forest Law. Article 26(2)
provides:
In the event that it becomes necessary for reasons of public interest, the
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry may cancel the Forest Preserve
Designation as to that portion.
Construction began immediately. Whereupon 271 local residents op-
posed to the base and their 453 attorneys of record brought the above
action for revocation of the cancellation of the disposition of the Minis-
ter of Agriculture and Forestry and an additional suit for suspension of
its enforcement. In the latter action the Sapporo District Court ordered
the suspension (Ita v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, HANREI JIH6
(No. 565) 23 (1969), HANREI TAIMUZU (No. 238) 287 (1969). The Sapporo
High Court, however, reversed the decision on the grounds that ade-
quate precautions had been taken to preclude any "urgent necessity"
(kinky ii no hitsuy~sei) arising out of a danger of flooding that might
require suspension of the administrative disposition. The facilities for
the missile base were completed by June, 1972.
The decision on the action for revocation of the cancellation of the
disposition of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry was handed down
on September 7, 1973, Judge Fukushima writing the opinion for the
three judge court.
* The English statement of facts is reprinted with permission of the Japanese American
Society for Legal Studies from 6 LAW IN JAPAN 175 (1973) (footnotes omitted). The English
summary translation of the court's opinion has kindly been provided by Professor Hideo
Tanaka of the Tokyo University School of Law.
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[The District Court revoked the disposition which cancelled the for-
est reserve designation on the grounds that the construction of the mis-
sile base did not constitute "public interest" as provided by the Forest
Act.
The Court first found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. It said:
As the provisions of the Forest Act show] the system of forest reserve
purports to protect interests in the safety of life, person, property, health
and other conditions of life of inhabitants in localities surrounding a
forest reserve. Such interests are not merely reflex interests as the defen-
dant argues but something legally protected by the Forest Act ....
In addition, the provisions of the Forest Act shall be understood in the
context of our constitutional system . . . . Thus understood, they are
to be understood as protecting the local inhabitants' "right to live in
peace" (Constitution, Preamble) with the aim of realizing the funda-
mental principles of our constitution, i.e., democracy, respect of funda-
mental human rights, and pacifism. Accordingly, if the disposition
made by the defendant under the Forest Act invades or threatens to
invade the local inhabitants' "right to live in peace," such inhabitants
shall have standing in court to attack the validity of such disposition.
[Then the court said that this case should not be disposed of solely as
a matter of statutory interpretation even if possible, because] In case
the court finds that a judgment of a case will not settle the underlying
dispute without deciding a constitutional issue raised therein the court
has the duty to decide the constitutionality of the act taken by the state.
It should not take a negative stand to evade deciding a constitutional
issue.
For though the court may give the appearance of giving redress to the
parties by deciding the case on other grounds, such redress is only formal
and superficial in nature and may give rise to another case under a
different outlook deriving from the same basic dispute. This is not the
right way of truly settling the dispute and giving redress to the parties.
In addition, such judgment would mean that the court acquiesces and
tolerates the unconstitutional exercise of state power, thereby opening
the way for further development of unconstitutional practice. This
would in fact make it difficult for the court to exercise its power of
judicial review in the future . . ., and would nullify the "obligation to
respect and uphold this Constitution" imposed upon all public officials
including judges by Article 99 of the Constitution.
Article 26(2) of the Forest Act provides that cancelling the forest
reserve designation should be done on the ground of "public interest."
Needless to say, "public interest" should be something recognized of
value under our entire legal system which has the Constitution at its
top. If the Self Defense Force is unconstitutional in its existence, the aim
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claimed by the defendant in cancelling the forest reserve designation
. . . cannot constitute "public interest." In order to construe the term
"public interest" in the Forest Act, we must therefore decide the issue
whether the installation of defense equipment in question is unconstitu-
tional or not.
[The court then dismissed the defendant's argument on the "political
question", saying that past cases invoking this doctrine were concerned
with the relationship between the Cabinet and the Diet, international
affairs of the Diet, or treaties, and that] "the concept of being highly
political nature" or "concerned with the fundamentals of government"
alleged by the defendant as the basis for invoking the doctrine of "politi-
cal question" is very vague . . . . Whenever the constitutionality of a
statute is questioned the matter inevitably involves a question of more
or less political nature. . . . If one excludes some act of the government
from the scope of judicial review by relying on a dangerously overbroad
interpretation of such a vague concept, one might lead the way for
closing the door of the court to people asking redress from the blunder
of the government. The defendant's argument, we believe, is not com-
patible with the principle of government by law, and judicial supremacy
as provided by Article 81 of the Constitution, as well as Articles 97 and
98.
. . . The Constitution clearly sets up legal norms in its Preamble and
Article 9 on the issue of the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces,
i.e., whether Japan should maintain armed power for her national secu-
rity. The meaning of the Preamble and Article 9 should be found objec-
tively in the same manner as in interpretation of any other legal norm.
Their interpretation should not change with the shift in political institu-
tions and international situations . . . . If the realities of the Self De-
fense Forces, its size, equipment, power etc., were to be proved through
the judicial process, the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces
would be decided easily without considering international situations
and the like.
The present Constitution thus prohibits the maintenance of armed
forces or other war potential in its Preamble and Article 9. This does not
mean that Japan has renounced the right of self defense. . . . The right
of self defense, however, does not necessarily mean self defense by
armed forces . . . . As other possible means there are ... , as witness
Shigejir6 Tabata [of the Kyoto University] mentioned, elimination of
invasion by the police, uprising of the people with arms, confiscation of
property held by the nationals of an invading nation, deportation of
such nationals. . ..
[Then the court examined in detail the history, organization, scope
of activities as provided by laws and regulations, equipment, strength,
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drill, budget of the Self Defense Forces as well as their link with the
American armed forces. Then it concluded:]
On the basis of organization, scales equipment and strength of the
Self Defense Forces as found above, it is clear that the Self Defense
Forces is "an organization of men and materials with the purpose of
carrying out battle with force against a foreign enemy." It, therefore,
falls within the meaning of the term of "armed forces". . . whose main-
tenance is prohibited by Paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Constitution
Since the Self Defense Forces is unconstitutional in itself, the reason
given for the cancellation of forest reserve designation in question can-
not satisfy the requirement of "public interest" provided in Article 26(2)
of the Forest Act.
